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The law of large numbers for completely random
behavior of market participants. Quantum economics
V. P. Maslov
Abstract
In this paper, we briefly discuss a mathematical concept that can be used in
economics.
It has been known since Jacob Bernoulli that averaging in economics is nonlinear and
does not obey the rules of ordinary arithmetics. For example, the average of winning or
losing, say, $100,000 is not equivalent to customary life for a person who is not wealthy,
since losing could mean their becoming homeless and even going to jail, whereas winning
would not raise their living standards high enough to justify the mere risk of losing.
Accumulating 51interest. By pooling their capital, owners can become monopolists
and raise prices. This also corroborates the nonarithmetic nature of addition. Further,
one observes nonlinear addition when buying goods wholesale: the more you buy, the less
you pay per item.
The mathematical problem of nonlinear averaging was attacked by the outstanding
Russian mathematician Kolmogorov, who obtained a general formula for the average. I
supplement his axioms by an additional axiom saying that if a (small) number is added
to each term in the sum, then the average increases by same number.
This unambiguously results in the following rule for the average of two numbers a and
b: (a “+” b)/2 = 1/β log[(2βaa + 2βbb)/2], where β is an unknown parameter and base 2
logarithm is used. For β = 0, one arrives at the conventional linear average. It is easily
seen that β is negative for purchase averaging and positive for sale averaging.
If the operation a ‘+’ b = 1/β log[2βa + 2βb] is taken as addition and the conventional
addition a+ b as multiplication, then the commutativity, associativity, and distributivity
laws hold. This arithmetics is possibly used somewhere in the “Kingdom of Distorting
Mirrors.”
In my opinion, this arithmetics is more adequate to a market economy than the con-
ventional, classical arithmetics and permits one, using model examples, to explain stock
price breakout, default, and a number of laws observed in statistical data processing.
In this note, I wish to present an economic effect that proved quite unexpected to
myself. I speak of a statistical sensation that would be nicknamed “fool’s luck” by ordinary
people. Since 2003, studies related to the analysis of operations at London stock exchange
have been evoking quite a response. About five hundred papers that can be found in the
Internet under the keywords zero intelligence discuss the problem of completely random
behavior of market participants. The point is that traders buying and selling stock have
to take into account so many various factors that they cannot make the right decision
unambiguously, and so the behavior of market participants does not differ from a random
behavior very much. And if it does, the trader usually loses. Here we assume that the
sales volume, the number of participants, the number of nomenclatures of financial tools
for each price, and the number of tools are sufficiently large.
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Thus what is a random choice?
To make a random choice, one should first calculate all possible choices of purchases
or sales and average them. The parameter β can relatively easily be expressed via the
budget restraint (BR) in the first case and via the required rate of return (RRR) in the
second case.
Note that possible choices of purchases and sales obey the so-called Bose statistics.
For example, the number of ways to buy nails and bread for 2 cents is as follows: 1) 2
cents for nails; 2) 2 cents for bread; 3) 1 cent for nails and 1 cent for bread. All in all,
there are three ways, since bank notes or coins of the same value are indistinguishable.
(The law that can be stated as “money does not smell”: nothing changes if one note is
exchanged for another.)
How to make a random choice? It suffices to number all possible purchases whose price
does not exceed BR and then choose a number randomly, as if throwing dice. Computer
generates random (more precisely, “pseudorandom”) numbers. It turns out that the law
of large numbers holds: given a BR, a vast majority of such random choices gives the
same value for the number of purchases at a given price. This value can be determined
in a very simple manner via the nonlinear average of all possible purchases by a small
variation of the given price. (The number of tools purchased at a given price is equal to
the partial derivative with respect to this price of the nonlinear average over all possible
purchases.) A similar law holds for sellers.
Note that the parameter β < 0 for purchasers can also be determined by equating the
derivative of the nonlinear average with respect to 1/β with the logarithm of the number
of possible purchases whose price does not exceed BR. Accordingly, for sellers (β > 0) the
derivative should be equated with the logarithm of the number of possible sales that give
a profit not less than RRR.
Thus if the behavior of market participants is completely random, then we can find
the number of goods purchased by a majority for a given price and even estimate the
fraction constituted by this majority. Conversely, if we cannot do that, then the behavior
of market participants cannot be viewed as random.
If the prices can be varied, then, by equating the amount of goods sold as a function
of RRR with the amount of goods purchased as a function of BR, we can find equilibrium
prices.
It follows from an analysis of papers in the “zero intelligence” series that traders who
do not subtilize, i.e., who act at random rather than deliberately, mainly do not lose. It
is not without reason that one speaks of fool’s luck or beginner’s luck: he who gambles
for the first time (and hence has not yet been spoiled by calculations) does not lose as a
rule. There is a large body of corroborating statistical evidence. Hence if we assume that
a vast majority of traders have zero intelligence, then the law established by the author
gives a right forecast of free market prices.
Let us discuss a similar situation for consumer goods. Suppose that a customer who
has a certain amount BR of money for buying gifts in advance for a large number of people
enters a gift shop (say, in Mexico) with k shop floors each of which offers a large variety of
souvenirs for the same price. The consumer does not know the tastes of all acquaintances
whom the gifts are intended for and buys at random. Then the above-mentioned law
applies, and one can rather accurately predict how much money the consumer will spend
at each shop floor. More precisely, if there are many similar consumers, then a vast
majority of them will spend exactly the amount predicted by this law at each shop floor.
This is a very simple model, which can be generalized. For example, consider the case
in which the goods are divided into i clusters with close prices within each cluster. Then
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one determines the (nonlinear) average profit over all goods if Ni goods are sold for these
prices and then the average price for the ith cluster is found. The above-mentioned law
remains valid in this case and determines the amount spent by a customer for a given
cluster of goods.
In this paper, we briefly discuss a mathematical concept that can be used in economics.
1 Nonlinear averaging in the sense of Kolmogorov
A sequence of functions Mn determines the regular type of the average if the following
(Kolmogorov) conditions are satisfied:
I. M(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is a continuous and monotone function in each variable. To be
definite, we assume that M increases in each variable.
II. M(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is a symmetric function
1.
III. The average of identical numbers is equal to their common value: M(x, x, . . . , x) =
x.
IV. A group of values can be replaced by their average so that the common average
does not change:
M(x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn) = Mn+m(x . . . , x, y, . . . , yn),
where x = M(x1, . . . , xn).
Theorem 1 (Kolmogorov) Under conditions I–IY, the average M(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
takes the form
M(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = ψ
ϕ(x1) + ϕ(x2) + . . .+ ϕ(xn)
n
, (1)
where ϕ is a continuous strictly monotone function and ψ is its inverse.
For the proof of the theorem, see [1].
2 The main averaging axiom
It is rather obvious for a stable system that the following axiom must hold.
If the same value ω is added to xk, then their average increases by this value ω.
Obviously, the nonlinear averaging of xi under normal conditions must also increase
by this value. We take this fact as Axiom 5.
This axiom leads to a unique solution in the nonlinear case, i.e., the linear case (the
arithmetic mean) naturally satisfies this axiom, as well as a unique (up to the same
constant by which we can multiply all the incomes xi) nonlinear function.
In fact, the incomes xi are calculated in some currency and, in general, must be
multiplied by a quantity β, which is responsible for the purchasing power of this currency,
so that this constant (the parameter β) must a priori be contained in the definition of the
income. Hence we can state that there exists a unique nonlinear function that satisfies
Axiom 5.
The function f(x) has the form
f(x) = C exp(Dx) +B, (2)
where C,D 6= 0 and B are numbers independent of x.
1In our case, the symmetry follows from the Bose statistics for bank notes.
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3 Semiring, an example of self-adjoint linear opera-
tors
We consider the semiring generated by nonlinear averaging and the space L2 ranging in
this semiring.
First, we consider a heat equation of the form
∂u
∂t
=
h
2
∂2u
∂x2
. (3)
Here h is a small parameter, but we do not use its smallness now.
Equation (3) is a linear equation. As is known, this means that if u1 and u2 are its
solutions, then the linear combination
u = λ1u1 + λ2u2 (4)
is also its solution. Here λ1 and λ2 are constants.
Now we perform the following change. We set
u = e−
w
h . (5)
Then we obtain the following nonlinear equation for the unknown function w(x, t):
∂w
∂t
+
1
2
(
∂w
∂x
)2
− h
2
∂2w
∂x2
= 0. (6)
This well-known equation is sometimes called the Bu¨rgers equation2.
The solution u1 of Eq. (3) is associated with the solution w1 = −h ln u1 of Eq. (6),
and the solution u2 of Eq. (3) is associated with the solution w2 = −h ln u2 of Eq. (6).
The solution (4) of Eq. (3) is associated with the solution w = −h ln(e−w1+µ1h + e−w2+µ2h ),
where µi = −h lnλi, i = 1, 2.
This implies that Eq. (6) is a linear equation, but it is linear in a function space, where
the following operations were introduced:
the operation of taking the sum a⊕ b = −h ln(e−ah + e−bh );
and the operation of multiplication a⊙ λ = a+ λ.
In this case, the change w = −h ln u takes zero to infinity and the unity to zero. Thus,
∞ is a generalized zero in this new space: Ø = ∞, and the usual zero is a generalized
unity: 1 = 0. The function space, where the operations ⊕ and ⊙ are introduced, with
the associated zero Ø and the unity 1 is isomorphic to the usual function space with the
usual multiplication and addition.
This can be interpreted in the following way: somewhere on another planet, the people
are used to deal with precisely these operations ⊕ and ⊙, and then Eq. (6) is a linear
equation from their viewpoint.
Everything written here is, of course, trivial, and the people on our planet need not
study new arithmetic operations, because, using a change of the function, one can pass
from Eq. (6) to Eq. (3), which is linear in the usual sense. But it turns out that the
“Kingdom of distorting mirrors” given by this semiring is related to the “capitalistic”
economics.
2The usual Bu¨rgers equation is obtained from this equation by differentiating with respect to x and
applying the change v = ∂w
∂x
.
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In the function space ranging in the ring a⊕ b = −h ln(e− ah + e− bh ), λ⊙ b = λ+ b, we
introduce the inner product
(w1, w2) = −h ln
∫
e
w1+w2
h dx.
We show that the product in this space has the following bilinear properties: (a⊕ b, c) =
(a, c)⊕ (b.c) and (λ⊙ a, c) = λ⊙ (a, c). Indeed,
(a⊕ b, c) = −h ln
(∫
exp
(
−(−h ln(e−ah + e−bh ) + c)
h
)
dx
)
=
= −h ln
(∫
(e
−a
h + e
−b
h )e
−c
h dx
)
= −h ln
(∫
e−
a+c
h dx+
∫
e−
b+c
h dx
)
= (a, c)⊕ (b, c),(7)
(λ⊙ a, c) = −h ln
∫
e−
a+λ
h e−
c
hdx =
= −h ln
(
e−
λ
h
∫
e−
a+c
h dx
)
= λ+ ln
∫
e−
a+c
h dx = λ⊙ (a, c).
We consider an example of self-adjoint operators in this space, namely, the operator
L : W −→W ⊙ (−h ln
(
(W ′)2
h2
− W
′′
h
)
.
And now we verify whether it is self-adjoint:
(W1, LW2) = −h ln
∫
e−
W1+LW2
h dx = (8)
= −h ln
∫
exp
[
−
(
W1 +W2 − h ln
(
W ′2)
2
h2
− W
′′
2
h
))
/h
]
dx =
= −h ln
∫
e
−W1
h e
−W2
h
(
(W ′2)
2
h2
− W
′′
2
h
)
dx = −h ln
∫
e
−W1
h
d2
dx2
e
−W2
h dx =
= −h ln
∫
d2
dx2
e
−W1
h e
−W2
h dx = −h ln
∫
e
−W1
h
(
(W ′1)
2
h2
− W
′′
1
h
)
e
−W2
h dx =
= −h ln
∫
exp
[
−
(
W1 − h ln
(
(W ′1)
2
h2
− W
′
2
h
))
/h
]
dx =
= −h ln
∫
e−
LW1+W2
h dx = (LW1,W2).
Its linearity can also be verified easily.
We construct the resolvent operator of the Bu¨rgers equation: L : W0 →W , where W
is a solution of Eq. (6) satisfying the initial condition W |t=0 = 0.
The solution of Eq. (3) satisfying the condition u|t=0 = u0 has the form
u =
1√
2πh
∫
e−
(x−ξ)2
2th u0(ξ)dξ.
Taking into account that u = e−
W
h and W = −h ln u, we obtain the resolvent Lt of the
Bu¨rgers equation
LtW0 = − h√
2πh
ln
∫
e
−
(
(x−ξ)2
2th
+w(ξ)
h
)
dξ. (9)
The operator Lt is self-adjoint in the new inner product.
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4 Entropy for the producer and the consumer. Con-
dition for the producer income and the consumer
expenditure. Production and consumption. Equi-
librium prices
We consider a large group of producers manufacturing goods ofM types. The correspond-
ing production structure is characterized by the vector ωN = 〈K1, . . . , KM〉, where Ki is
the number of goods of the ith type, i = 1, . . . ,M , and
M∑
i=1
Ki = N . The consumption
structure is treated similarly. Suppose that ǫi is the price of goods of the ith type. The
income obtained by selling N units of goods is equal to E =
M∑
i=1
ǫiKi.
The concepts introduced below are based on the notion of nonlinear averaging of
the incomes obtained by realizing N units of goods over all possible versions ωN of the
production structure for a given positive value of the parameter β:
MN =
1
β
log
(
1
L
∑
K1+···+KM=N
2
β
n∑
i=1
ǫiKi
)
. (10)
The nonlinear averaging is discussed in detail in [2].
4.1 Psychology of an ordinary depositor. Psychological law of
status quo preservation
We note that losing $100,000 is much heavier in its psychological “cost” than winning
the same sum. This means that an ordinary person prefers to preserve status quo, i.e.,
not to take risk of losing $100,000. Therefore, if a person deposits a certain sum N in
several banks at high interest, he must calculate what sum is sufficient for him to live like
a rentier, to preserve status quo, and, accordingly, how to spread the money over several
banks so as not to take any risk and not to lose his status.
This purely psychological fact is the base of our mathematical calculations. We note
that an ordinary depositor can rather easily calculate the sum of income, but it is difficult
for him to evaluate the reliability of a bank proposing high interest rates. Therefore, in
the formulas given below, the free parameter β can be determined in terms of the sum of
income introduced above, and then we obtain graphs showing how the bank deposits ni
depend on the a priori given income.
The problem of calculating the “surviving probability,” which is close to the “status
quo preservation law,” has been discussed by specialists in mathematical economics.
If the required rate of return (RRR)
∑
niλi = E is assumed to be an independent
variable, then the nonlinear averaging based on the Kolmogorov axioms and the additional
axiom proposed by the author is unique.
We assume that production runs normally if the producer’s income
∑n
1 εiNi is larger
than or at least equal to a quantity E1. The consumer cannot spend more that E2 =∑n
1 εiN2 (the budget restraint – BR). We consider the “entropies” of the producer and
the consumer as follows: H1(ε1, · · · , εn, E1) is the base 2 logarithm of the number of sale
versions for a sum no less than E1; H2(ε
′
1, · · · , ε′n, E2) is the base 2 logarithm of the
number of purchase versions for a sum not exceeding E2.
Let M˜ be the sum (10) for β < 0, and let θ = 1
β
.
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The equation
∂M
∂θ
= H1
allows us to obtain θ = θ1(H1), and the equation
∂M˜
∂θ
= H2
allows us to obtain θ = θ2(H1).
We choose k possible purchase versions at random.
It turns our that, for the majority of these versions, the sum of money spent for buying
goods at price εi, is “almost” equal to
∂M
∂εi
|θ=θ1
(this is an analog of the law of large numbers; the exact estimates are the same as in the
usual law of large numbers).
A similar statement holds for the seller. The equilibrium prices follows from the
relation
∂M
∂εi
|θ=θ1(ε) =
∂M˜
∂εi
|θ=θ2(ε), i = 1, · · · , n.
Thus, the “resources–producer–consumer–etc.” vertical line is divided into pairs each of
which contains two new numbers, RRR and BR. The entropy (the Kolmogorov complex-
ity) and the degree of risk are “hidden” in the intermediate calculations. This is how the
usual model of economical equilibrium (the general equilibrium) varies.
The models of dynamical equilibrium (the intertemporal general equilibrium) vary
similarly according to formula (41) given in [3], p. 276.
The price equilibrium condition is determined by the relations
∂M
∂εi
|θ=θ1(ε,E1) =
∂tildeM
∂εi
|θ=θ2(ε,E2). (11)
.
It follows from the “pair” law that the derivative of the average with respect to the
“temperature” θ is the entropy and the derivative with respect to the price is the quantity
of goods. Relation (11) is well known in the linear case. Here we generalize it to the non-
linear case. This generalization allows us to take the Kolmogorov complexity into account,
and hence the entropy, which is one of the most important notions in economics. Its con-
jugate, the temperature, determines the degree of risk, and sometimes, the volatility. But
the variables in the final formulas contain only the incomes RRR and the expenditures
BR, which can be calculated easily. Thus, H and θ are “hidden parameters” here.
5 Tunnel canonical operator in economics
The equilibrium prices are determined by the condition that the demand and offer must
be the same for each item of goods and resources. The following pairs can be determined
similarly: flows of goods and services – prices; flows of trade of different kinds – salary
rates; flows of raw material resources – rents; interest – loan volume.
The asymptotics of M and M˜ is given by the tunnel canonical operator in the phase
space of pairs.
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We consider the phase space R2n, where the intensive variables play the role of coor-
dinates and the extensive variables play the role of momenta. In economics, the role of
values of a random variable λi can be played by the prices of the corresponding goods,
and Ni can, for example, be the number of sold goods, i.e., the number of people who
bought goods of this particular type, or the interest paid by the ith bank, etc. Obvi-
ously, the price depends on the demand, i.e., λi(Ni) is a curve in the two-dimensional
phase space. In the two-dimensional phase space, to each point (vector) λi, i = 1, . . . , n,
there corresponds a vector Ni(λ1, . . . , λn), i = 1, . . . , n. In a more general case, this is
an N -dimensional manifold (surface), where the “coordinates” and “momenta” locally
depend on n parameters, and the following condition is satisfied: the Lagrange brackets
of the “coordinates” and “momenta” are zero with respect to these parameters. Hence
such a manifold was called a Lagrangian manifold by the author. In other words, the
form
∑
Nidλi is closed (see the Afterword in [4] and [5]). This means that
∫
Nidλi is
independent of the path and is called an action like
∫
pdq (p is the momentum and q is
the coordinate) in mechanics.
The producer acquires resources and transforms the resources expenditure vector into
the vector of material wealth production. Then the consumer acquires this material
wealth. Thus, the equilibrium prices of resources and of the consumer material wealth
are determined according to the above relations.
In addition to such equilibrium prices, there can also be vertical pairs for some types
of material wealth and seller–buyer pairs (i.e., permanent seller – permanent buyer pairs),
and the prices related to these pairs are formed. This is an analog of the Cooper pairs in
quantum statistics.
This construction requires the use of the ultra-secondary quantization method in ab-
stract algebraic form, which could be applied in economics. The “vertical” clusters are
also formed in this theory.
Thus, we have determined the parameter β, and the problem is solved completely.
Example. In what follows, a person who buys stocks will be called a player. Suppose
that there are only two types of stocks, the first are conditionally called “cheap” stocks
and the stocks of the second type are said to be “expensive.” We assume that a player
buys a packet of N stocks in which the number of cheap stocks is N1 and the number of
expensive stocks is N2 = N −N1, respectively. A player spends money to buy stocks, and
the number of purchased stocks affects the price of stocks of both types. In particular,
the larger is the number of expensive stocks bought by a player, the less their price will
be. Consequently, in what follows, we assume that the player’s expenditures for a packet
of stocks depend nonlinearly on the number of purchased cheap and expensive stocks. For
example, it depends quadratically as follows:
E(N1) = λ1N1 + λ2N2 − γN
2
1
2N
− γN
2
2
2N
= λ2N − γN
2
+ (λ1 − λ2 + γ)N1 − γN
2
1
N
, (12)
where the numbers λ1, λ2, and γ satisfy the conditions
γ
2
< λ1 < λ2, λ2 − λ1 < γ < 2(λ2 − λ1). (13)
It follows from conditions (13) that the function (12) with N1 = 0, 1, . . . , N has the global
minimum for N1 = N and a local minimum for N1 = 0.
If, at the initial moment, the player buys N1 cheap stocks and N2 expensive stocks so
that N1 <
λ1−λ2+γ
γ
N , then selling one cheap and one expensive stock so as to decrease
E(N2), he will come to a local minimum at N1 = 0, i.e., he will buy all expensive stocks.
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Figure 1: Graph of E(N1) for T = 0
But if N1 >
λ1−λ2+γ
γ
N , then, as a result of a monotone process, the player will buy all
cheap stocks.
Now we consider local financial averagings of the player income. We assume that G1
dealers sell cheap stocks and G2 dealers sell expensive stocks. In this case, the number of
different ways in which the player can buy a packet of stocks is
Γ(N1) =
(N1 +G1 − 1)!
(G1 − 1)!N1!
(N −N1 +G2 − 1)!
(G2 − 1)!(N −N1)! . (14)
Remark. Instead of introducing different dealers, we can assume that the cheapest
and the most expensive stocks are, respectively, of G1 and G2 different types, but of the
same price.
We assume that, for β = ∞, the player is at the point of local minimum for N1 = 0.
Since he tries to change the stocks pairwise and gradually (monotonically) so that not to
increase his expenditures 3, we can consider the averaging only in a neighborhood of the
point of local minimum (the local financial averaging). If β varies slowly and N → ∞,
then the asymptotics of Mβ as N →∞ again corresponds to the local minimum
E(N1) = β(λ1N1 + λ2N2 − γN
2
1
2N
− γN
2
2
2N
) +
+ ln
(N1 +G1 − 1)!
(G1 − 1)!N1!
(N −N1 +G2 − 1)!
(G2 − 1)!(N −N1)! . (15)
Figure 3 shows how the entropy depends on the temperature and the local and global
minima.
The curve breaks at the point T ≈ 40. At this point, the derivative ∂S
∂T
becomes
infinite, and the modified Laplace method, which could be used for the asymptotics of
3The least risk principle in economics.
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Figure 2: Graph of E(N1) for T = 5, G2 = 30, and γ = 1.5
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Figure 3: The heavy line corresponds to the local minimum, the global minimum lies
below. At the point T = 40, the local minimum and the global maximum coincide and
do not exist for T > 40.
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the local Mβ at the other points, cannot be used near this point. The local minimum
obtained by computer shows unstable “spreading.” It turns out that the asymptotics near
this point can be expressed in terms of the Airy function of an imaginary argument, and
this fact removes all the problems listed above.
For T > 40, no equilibrium can exist when small changes in purchasing and selling
occur. Therefore, to return to the equilibrium point formed as a result of changes in the
local averaging near another local minimum, the player must change a large amount of
stocks at once (see Fig. 3).
A similar situation occurs when κ = 1 and the player wants to win as much as possible.
Then the points of minima are replaced by the points of maxima between which, in the
case of a quadratic dependence on N1 and N2, there is a minimum. If T varies from zero
to some T0 at which the local maximum disappears, then a jump occurs, which can be
treated as a stock price break-down. In our case, if the player simultaneously and very
fast sells a large amount of stocks of one type and buys a large amount of stocks of a
different type, then he can again get to another equilibrium point.
We have considered only the simplest model. In a more complicated economical situa-
tion concerning the interests of a great mass of the population, the people cannot change
their behavior very fast, passing, for example, from the usual consumer basket to a differ-
ent basket and thus changing their mode of life. Then there is no equilibrium (balance)
point in general, and a sharp disbalance leads to general default.
Generalization. In our example, we obtained a one-dimensional curve correspond-
ing to a local minimum of the entropy dependence on the “temperature” in the two-
dimensional S, T -space and considered its projection on the T -axis at the point T0. This
projection is not “good,” and we said that the asymptotics of Mβ in a neighborhood of
this point must be replaced by the Airy function.
What picture appears in the general case where we have two “conjugate” pairs: the
entropy–temperature pair and, for example, the number of people N corresponding to
some average salary εk.
In this case, we consider a four-dimensional (phase) space, where T, ε are the “co-
ordinates” and N, S are the momenta. The surface corresponding to our curve is two-
dimensional and can (locally) be written in parametric form as
T = T (α1, α2), ε = ε(α1, α2), N = N(α1, α2), S = S(α1, α2),
where α1, α2 are parameters.
Because this surface must be obtained (at least, at the simple points of projection on
the “coordinate” plane) from the asymptotics of sums of the form
Mβ =
1
κβ
ln(
eκβa + eκβb
2
), κ = ±1, β > 0,
it must be a Lagrangian manifold (this notion was introduced by the author in [5]). At
the points of “bad projection” on the T, ε-plane, the asymptotics is given by the tunnel
canonical operator [5], and its simplification, depending on the form of the surface near
the point of “bad projection,” can be obtained using [6].
These general considerations can help constructing the corresponding model of a given
economical situation if the appropriate statistical data are available.
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6 The law of large numbers
We consider the sellers who sell goods of M types. The corresponding structure of sold
goods is characterized by the vector ωN = 〈K1, . . . , KM〉, where Ki is the number of
goods of the ith type, i = 1, . . . ,M , and
M∑
i=1
Ki ≤ N . The structure of purchased goods is
considered similarly. Suppose that ǫi is the price of goods of the ith type. The income
obtained by realizing K1 + · · ·+Kn units of goods is E(ωN) =
M∑
i=1
ǫiKi.
The concepts introduced below are based on the notion of nonlinear averaging of the
incomes obtained by realizing ≤ N units of goods over all possible versions ωN of the
structure of sold goods for a given positive value of the parameter β:
MN (β) =
1
β
log
(
1
L
∑
ωN
2βE(ω
N )
)
=
1
β
log
(
1
L
∑
K1+···+KM≤N
2
β
n∑
i=1
ǫiKi
)
, (16)
where L is the number of terms in the sum. The nonlinear averaging is discussed in
detail in [2]. In the present paper, we show that, under certain natural assumptions,
the average can be calculated only in two ways: as the usual linear average and as the
nonlinear average of the form (16).
We divide the goods of all types into groups with different prices. Suppose that the
total number of groups of such goods is n, n ≤ M , the ith group contains Gi types of
goods with the common price λi and λ1 < λ2 < · · · < λn.
In our statement, each λi is equal to one of ǫj . We denote λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn). By
definition, we have
n∑
i=1
Gi = M . Let Ki,j be the total number of units of goods of the
jth type in the ith group of goods with the common price λi. Thus, the structure of sold
goods is given by the vector
ωN = 〈K1,1, . . . , K1,G1 , . . . , Ki,1, . . . , Ki,Gi, . . . , Kn,1, . . . , Kn,Gn〉. (17)
Let Ni =
Gi∑
j=1
Ki,j be the number of all units of goods with the price λi, and let νi = Ni/N
be the part of all such goods in their total amount, where i = 1, . . . , n. The price structure
of sold goods is characterized by the vector 〈N1, . . . , Nn〉 or, in fractions, by the vector
〈ν1, . . . , νn〉. (18)
Then the total cost of all N units of goods is
E(ωN) =
n∑
i=1
λiNi = N
n∑
i=1
λiνi. (19)
By ΞN1,...,NnN we denote the set of all versions of the structure of sold goods with a prescribed
price structure 〈N1, . . . , Nn〉. The number of elements in this set is4
|ΞN1,...,NnN | =
(
N1 +G1 − 1
G1 − 1
)
· · · · ·
(
Nn +Gn − 1
Gn − 1
)
. (20)
4|A| denotes the number of elements in the set A.
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If the goods are separated in groups, then the sum (16) becomes
MN(β, λ) =
1
β
log
(
1
L
∑
N1+···+Nn≤N
|ΞN1,...,NnN |2
β
n∑
i=1
λiNi
)
, (21)
where L is the total number of all possible versions of the structure of sold goods, and
the second sum in (16) is taken over all the price structures 〈N1, . . . , Nn〉.
We assume that the sellers have sold at most N units of goods of different types. We
consider the problem of predicting the “most expected” structure of goods realized in
the free market, which is necessary for the average income to be at least E1. Thus, the
following inequality must hold:
n∑
i=1
λiNi ≥ E1. (22)
In addition, the following natural inequality must hold:
n∑
i=1
Ni ≤ N. (23)
We introduce the main definitions. The base 2 logarithm of the number of possible versions
of sale of N units of goods for which the income is no less than E1, i.e., (22) is satisfied,
will be called the entropy H(E1, λ, N).
By θ(E1, λ, N) we denote the solution (with respect to θ) of the equation
∂MN (θ
−1, λ))
∂θ
= H(E1, λ, N). (24)
The solution of this equation exists and is unique. This follows from the monotonicity.
We set
ν˜i(E1, λ, N)) =
1
N
∂MN
∂λi
|θ=θ(E1,λ) (25)
for i = 1, . . . , n.
The notions introduced above are of general character and can be used for all possible
versions of the goods distribution. In what follows, we consider a specific case for which
we find the asymptotics of the introduced variables and prove a certain simplest version
of the “law of large numbers” under the following conditions.
We introduce the notation νi = Ni/N and pi(N) = Gi/N for i = 1, . . . , n. We assume
that the variables pi(N) have the limit pi as N →∞, and this limit is greater than zero
for all i. We also assume that E1 = e1N . Let ρ = N/M be a constant (one can also
assume that N/M → ρ as N →∞).
In what follows, we also need the restriction e1 ≤ ρ
n∑
i=1
λipi on the value of the average
income per unit sold goods.
Theorem 2 Let n ≥ 3. Then, for an arbitrary ǫ > 0, the part of all versions of the
structure of sold goods (18) for which the average income per unit goods is no less than
e1
5 and |νi − ν˜i| ≥ ǫ at least for a single i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, does not exceed 2−cǫ2N , where c is
a constant.
5i.e., under restrictions (22) and (23).
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The conditions of the theorem contain the assumption that the number of nomencla-
tures of goods with the same price is sufficiently large. But one can unite a group of
goods with different prices and, calculating the nonlinear average of these prices, replace
this group of prices in the statement of the theorem by this nonlinear average price.
We shall write the corresponding formula.
We consider a set of prices λi, where i = 1, . . . , n, and a set of numbers gi equal,
for example, to the number of goods of different types but with the same price λi. The
numbers gi are quantities of the order of 1. By Ni we denote the number of goods
purchased at the price λi. Taking into account the fact that gi different goods can be
purchased at the price λi, the number of different way for buying Ni goods at the price
λi is given by the formula
γi(Ni) =
(Ni + gi − 1)!
Ni!(gi − 1)! , (26)
and the number of different ways for buying the set of goods {N} = N1, . . . , Nn is,
respectively, equal to
Γ({N}) =
n∏
i=1
γi(Ni) =
n∏
i=1
(Ni + gi − 1)!
Ni!(gi − 1)! . (27)
We assume that the goods are divided in m ≤ n groups as follows. Suppose that there
are two sequences iα and jα, where α = 1, . . . , m, such that
iα ≤ jα, iα+1 = jα + 1, α = 1, . . . , m,
i1 = 1, jm = n. (28)
In this case, we say that the goods belong to the group of goods with number α if their
price λi satisfies the condition iα ≤ i ≤ jα. By N˜α we denote the number of purchased
goods from the group with number α. This number is given by the formula
N˜α =
jα∑
i=iα
Ni. (29)
We introduce wα, which is the nonlinearly averaged price of goods in group α,
wα =
1
βN˜α
log
 α∑
{N}
jα∏
i=iα
γi(Ni)2
−βλiNi
− log(γ˜α(N˜α))
 , (30)
where β is an economic parameter, for example, the volatility. We also use the notation
α∑
{N}
, (31)
which means that the summation is performed over all the sets of nonnegative integers
Niα , . . . , Njα such that
jα∑
i=iα
Ni = N˜α. (32)
Moreover, γ˜α(N˜α) is given by the formula
γ˜α(N˜α) =
α∑
{N}
jα∏
i=iα
γi(Ni). (33)
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We can show that (33) satisfies the formula
γ˜α(N˜α) =
(N˜α + g˜α − 1)!
N˜α!(g˜α − 1)!
, (34)
where
g˜α =
jα∑
i=iα
gi. (35)
We note that, in general, the nonlinearly averaged price of goods in group α depends
on β and N˜α.
Now we consider the nonlinear expectation of the income
M(β, λ,N) = − 1
β
log
 ′∑
{N}
n∏
i=1
γi(Ni)2
−βλiNi
 , (36)
where
′∑
{N}
(37)
denotes the sum over all sets of nonnegative integers {N} = N1, . . . , Nn such that
n∑
i=1
Ni = N. (38)
Proposition 1 The nonlinear expectation (36) satisfies the relation
M(β, λ,N) = − 1
β
log
 ′∑
{N˜}
m∏
α=1
γ˜α(N˜α)2
−βwαN˜α
 , (39)
where
′∑
{N˜}
(40)
denotes the sum over all sets of nonnegative integers {N˜} = N˜1, . . . , N˜m such that
m∑
α=1
N˜α = N. (41)
This assertion readily follows from the definitions of nonlinearly averaged prices (34)
and nonlinear expectation of income (36).
Now we have
ν˜α =
∂M
∂ωλ
,
and the law of large numbers theorem remains the same, where ν˜α is the number of goods
purchased at the prices λi for iα ≤ i ≤ jα.
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